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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Section 78-2a-3(2)(a).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Petitioner intends to assert the following issues on appeal:
1.

Whether the Appeals Board exceeded its authority by

considering arguments that were not previously raised in the case.
Standard of review: This issue constitutes a question of law,
and is subject to the correction of error standard of review. Savage
Industries. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission. 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991).
This issue was preserved in the record at (R. 941,943,945).
2.

Whether the Appeals Board failed to apply the appropriate legal

standard in determining Petitioner's retaliation claim.
Standard of review: This issue constitutes a question of law,
and is subject to the correction of error standard of review. Savage
Industries. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission. 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991).
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This issue was preserved in the record at (R. 940-941, 943-944,945).
3.

Whether the Appeals Board committed legal error by failing to

consider the credibility determinations of the Administrative Law Judge.
Standard of review: This issue constitutes a question of law,
and is subject to the correction of error standard of review. Savage
Industries. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission. 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991).
This issue was preserved in the record at (R. 946).
4.

Whether the evidence in the case supports the decision of the

Appeals Board.
Standard of Review: This issue constitutes a question of fact
and is subject to the substantial evidence standard of review. Utah Code
Section 63-46b-l 6(g).
This issue was preserved in the record at (R. 943-946).
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DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Section 34A-l-303(4)(c) may be determinative or of
central importance to Issue 1 set form above. Section 34A-l-303(4)(c)
states:
The commissioner or Appeals Board may base its decision on:
(i) the evidence previously submitted in the case; or
(ii) on written argument or written supplemental evidence
requested by the commissioner or the Appeals Board.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Susan Carter ("Carter") filed a Charge of Discrimination
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination and Labor Division ("UALD") on August
11,1998, alleging that she had been terminated from her employment by
Sullivan-Schein Dental Co. ("Sullivan") in retaliation for making a
complaint of gender discrimination, in violation of Utah Code Section 34A5-106(1).
After conducting an investigation, the UALD issued a Determination
finding reasonable cause to believe that Sullivan had violated 34A-5-106(1)
in relation to Carter's termination.
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Sullivan appealed said Determination, and the case was assigned to
the Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. After the parties
conducted substantial discovery, Sullivan filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment that was denied by Administrative Law Judge Richard M. La
Jeunesse ("ALJ La Jeunesse").
A four-day evidentiary hearing was held before ALJ La Jeunesse,
after which he issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order,
dated January 7,2004. In summary, ALJ La Jeunesse found that Sullivan
had violated Section 34A-5-106(1) in relation to Carter's termination.
Sullivan filed a Motion for Review with the Appeals Board of the
Utah Labor Commission ("the Appeals Board") on March 8,2004. Carter
submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to said Motion for Review. No
hearing was held in relation to said Motion for Review, and no additional
evidence or argument was requested by the Appeals Board.
On May 31,2005, the Appeals Board issued an Order Granting
Motion for Review. In summary, said Order reversed the decision of ALJ
La Jeunesse, and held that Respondent had not violated Section 34A-5-
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106(1) in regard to Carter's termination. Said Order was based upon a 2-1
split decision of the Appeals Board, with two members voting in support of
the Order. A separate opinion written by the dissenting member of the
Appeals Board stated, in part: "The Majority's opinion is wrong on both the
facts and the law." (R. 936).
Carter subsequently filed a Motion to Reconsider Order on Motion for
Review, which was denied by the same 2-1 majority of the Appeals Board.
(R. 970-972).
Carter timely filed her Petitioner for Review with the Utah Court of
Appeals on September 13,2005. (R. 974-975).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

From approximately November 1992 to August of 1993, Carter

was employed with Mt. West Dental as a sales representative for dental
supplies. (See Carter's Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 71-72,
79,173). During such employment, Carter believed she was discriminated
against on the basis of her gender by her supervisors, Parke Simmons
("Simmons") and Blaine Brown ("Brown"). (See Carter Testimony, March
-8-

26,2003 Transcript, pp. 71-80).
2.

Subsequent to her termination from Mt. West Dental, Carter

became employed with Henry Schein Inc., as a sales representative for
dental supplies. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 8081).
3.

Prior to August of 1997, Simmons and Brown became

employed with Sullivan Dental Products, Inc., as equipment sales specialists.
(See Simmons' Testimony, March 27,2003 Transcript, pp. 190-191).
4.

Commencing August of 1997, a merger occurred between

Henry Schein, Inc. and Sullivan Dental Products, Inc. The merged entity
became Sullivan-Schein Dental Co. ("Sullivan"). (See Carter Testimony,
March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 81-82).
5.

Carter was assigned to the Sullivan sales force in Salt Lake

City, Utah, as were Simmons and Brown. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,
2003 Transcript, pp. 81-84).
6.

Because of her concerns regarding potential discrimination

from Simmons and Brown, Carter delivered a letter to Sullivan management
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on December 14,1997, alleging she had been subjected to gender
discrimination during her prior employment by Simmons and Brown, and
requesting that she not be assigned to the same office as Simmons and
Brown. Carter further requested that her letter be treated as confidential.
{See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 84-88 and Exh. P-2).
7.

Carter's letter was handled by Sullivan's Vice President and

Special Council, Leonard David ("David"). At Mr. David's direction,
Simmons and Brown were informed of Carter's complaint and instructed not
to retaliate against Carter. During the course of Mr. David's handling of the
letter, the substance of Carter's complaint was disclosed to Simmons,
Brown, and at least eight Sullivan Managers, including Carter's second-level
Manager, James Engel ("Engel"), and Carter's third-level Manager, James
Stanly ("Stahly"). (R. 774).
8.

On December 29,1997, Mr. David sent a letter to Carter,

stating that her complaint had been investigated and that appropriate action
had been taken. However, Carter's request mat she not be assigned to the

-10-

same office as Simmons and Brown was not addressed. (See Carter
Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 89-90 and Exh. P-3).
9.

Prior to the merger, the sales representatives of Henry Shein,

Inc. and Sullivan Dental Products, Inc. competed for customers, and had
overlapping sales territories. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003
Transcript, pp. 93-94). Commencing the first week of January 1998, the two
sales forces integrated. However, substantial confusion and conflict existed
in regard to the sales territories at least until the time of Carter's termination
on March 25,1998. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp.
97-98,102-103; See Butler Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 229238).
10.

During approximately December of 1997, Joe Scheutzow

("Scheutzow") was assigned as Manager for the Region that included the
Salt Lake City sales representatives. As such, he became the direct
supervisor of Carter, Simmons, Brown, and several other sales
representatives operating out of Salt Lake City, Utah. (See Carter
Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 94-95).
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11.

James Engel ("Engel") was the Northwest Zone Manager for

Sullivan, and was Carter's second-level Manager. (R. 774).
12.

Shortly after Scheutzow was assigned as Carter's supervisor,

Carter informed him of her complaint regarding Simmons and Brown. (See
Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 94-97). Approximately
one month later, Scheutzow told Carter that he had previously known about
her complaint. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 116118).
13.

At Trial and in his Deposition, Scheutzow denied that he had

any knowledge of Carter's complaint prior to her termination. (See
Scheutzow Testimony, March 27,2003 Transcript, pp. 142-143).
However, Scheutzow's knowledge of Carter's complaint was established by
Simmons, who testified that Scheutzow told him he knew of the complaint
and that "everybody better be careful." (See Simmons' Testimony, March
27,2003 Transcript, pp.204-205; R.774-775).
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14.

Scheutzow's office was located in Seattle, Washington, and he

only occasionally visited the Salt Lake City Office. During his absence,
Simmons and Brown exercised informal supervisory authority over the Salt
Lake City sales representatives and presided over the monthly sales
meetings. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 118-119;
R. 775).
15.

In addressing the overlapping sales territories among the sales

representatives, Scheutzow initially instructed the sales representatives to
continue calling upon the same customers they had called on prior to the
merger. This resulted in numerous instances in which multiple sales
representatives were calling upon the same account. This situation was
referred to as a "crossover."1 Numerous crossovers occurred after the
merger, resulting in substantial confusion among the sales representatives
1

Sullivan's Director of Human Resources, Gary Anderson ("Anderson"),
testified regarding a distinction between "crossovers," where two sales
representatives are assigned to a single account, and "poaching," where one
sales representative calls upon an account that has been assigned to another
sales representative. However, none of the sales representatives who
testified (Carter, Butler, Simmons or Bingham) made such a distinction.
Likewise, the sales representatives' Managers (Scheutzow, Engel) did not
note such a distinction. For the most part, references to "crossovers" by the
witnesses include the concept of "poaching." See Scheutzow Testimony,
March 27,2003 Transcript, pp. 145-152; See Simmons Testimony, March
27,2003 Transcript, 207).
-
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and their customers. Further, competition existed among the sales
representatives with respect to specific customers. {See Carter Testimony,
March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 102-103,107,111-116,168-169; See Butler
Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 225-228; See Engel Testimony,
March 28,2003 Transcript, pp. 103-105,115; R. 776-777;).
16.

Scheutzow and Engel received numerous complaints from the

sales representatives relating to crossover issues. In general, the sales
representatives were instructed to be patient while the customers were being
assigned. {See Butler Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 241-242).
17.

Scheutzow testified that several of the sales representatives had

crossover issues that he considered severe. However, none of the sales
representatives received discipline for crossover issues except Carter.
{See Scheutzow Testimony, March 27,2003 Transcript, pp. 145-146; R.
777).
18.

Scheutzow and Engel gradually assigned customers to specific

sales representatives. Each sales representative was provided a "run list,"
which set forth the accounts that were assigned to that sales representative.
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Once a customer was assigned to a specific sales representative, the other
sales representatives were expected to refrain from calling upon that
customer. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 103-106,
168-169 and Exh.P-7).
19.

Prior to the merger, Carter and former Sullivan Dental Products

sales representative Melanie Bingham ("Bingham") both called upon the
account of Dr. James Clegg. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003
Transcript, pp. 121-122).
20.

During approximately February 1998, the Clegg account was

assigned to Bingham. (Id).
21.

Shortly after the assignment of the Clegg account to Bingham,

Carter met one of Dr. Clegg's employees at a dental convention. Dr.
Clegg's employee asked Carter a question about Dr. Clegg's bill. Carter
answered the question, and directed the employee to have Bingham address
the issue. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 122-124).
22.

Also shortly after the Clegg account was assigned to Bingham,

Carter was approached by Dr. Clegg while she was visiting another dentist
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in the same building. Dr. Clegg asked a similar question about his billing,
and Carter referred him to Bingham. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,
2003 Transcript, pp. 124-125).
23.

Bingham learned about the contact between Carter and Dr.

Clegg's office, and complained to Brown, who referred her to Scheutzow.
(R. 778).
24.

On February 18,1998, Engel sent a letter to Carter,

reprimanding her for calling on the Clegg account. Said letter falsely
accused Carter of offering better discounts than Bingham could offer. Said
letter threatened Carter with disciplinary action, including termination of
employment, in the event of any "further infractions." (See Carter
Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 125-129 and Exh. P-8).
25.

Engel did not discuss the issue regarding the Clegg account

with Carter prior to sending said letter. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,
2003 Transcript, p. 127; See Engel Testimony, March 28,2003 Transcript,
pp. 179-181; R. 779).
26.

Engel considered the letter to constitute a disciplinary action

against Carter. (R. 779).
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27.

At the time of Engel's letter, Sullivan had in effect a Handbook

and Disciplinary Procedure requiring that all disciplinary actions be
reviewed by Human Resources, and that the employee have an opportunity
to respond to the disciplinary action. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,
2003 Transcript, pp. 98-102 and Exhs. P-4 and P-5).
28.

Human Resources was not contacted in regard to Engel's

disciplinary action against Carter. (See Engel Testimony, March 28,2003
Transcript, pp. 192).
29.

The testimony of Sullivan's witnesses about how Engel's letter

to Carter came about was substantially conflicting. ALJ La Jeunesse
described such testimony as " almost surrealistic." (R. 781). Scheutzow
denied having any involvement at all in the letter. Engel stated that he wrote
the letter at Scheutzow's request. Bingham testified that she initially
complained to Brown, who suggested she discuss the matter with
Scheutzow, and that Schetzow then directed her to write a letter to Engel
concerning the issue. Engel denied ever seeing such a letter. (R. 781).
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30.

Carter called Engel, explained what had occurred with the

Clegg account, and complained about Engel's letter. Engel admitted that the
letter was "harsh." (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, p.
128; See Engel Testimony, March 28,2003 Transcript, p. 141; R. 781).
31.

After receiving Engel' s letter, Carter contacted Bingham and

explained what had occurred with the Clegg account. Bingham apologized
to Carter, and there were no problems between Carter and Bingham
thereafter. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 129-131).
32.

Bingham also told Carter that Brown had informed her about

Carter's letter. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 121,
129-130).
33.

Carter subsequently called Sullivan's Director of Human

Resources, Gary Anderson ("Anderson") and complained about Engel's
letter. Anderson told Carter that Engel had confirmed the problem with Dr.
Clegg's office. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 131133). However, after Carter's termination, Dr. Clegg informed Carter that
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Engel had not contacted his office. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003
Transcript, pp. 131-133 and Exh. P-34).
34.

Prior to Carter's termination on March 25,1998, the Heritage

Dental account was included on Carter's run list. (See Carter Testimony,
March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 190-194).
35.

Heritage Dental was a dental laboratory. The owner of

Heritage Dental, Mark Mason ("Mason"), did not order his dental supplies
through a sales representative, as he preferred to order them over the
telephone. (R. 781).
36.

Individual dentists who worked within Heritage Dental had

separate accounts with Sullivan. One of such dentists, John Willardsen, was
also on Carter's run list. (See Butler Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript,
pp. 194-196).
37.

Approximately 3-4 weeks prior to Carter's termination,

Heritage Dental's office manager, Beverly Myers ("Myers") allegedly called
Butler, complained about Carter, and asked Butler to take over as Heritage
Dental's sales representative. (R. 782).2

Myers denies mat she ever asked Butler to replace Carter as Heritage
Dental's sales representative. (R.783). Further, it is undisputed that Mason
preferred to order his dental supplies via telephone.

3 8.

Butler informed Scheutzow of the alleged call from Myers, and

Scheutzow instructed Butler to take over as Heritage Dental's sales
representative. However, Scheutzow never told Carter that she had been
replaced as Heritage Dental's sales representative. Carter continued to call
upon Heritage Dental and the individual dentists who worked within
Heritage Dental. {See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp.
135-136; R. 782-783).
39.

On or about March 25,1998, Myers allegedly called Butler

again and told him that Carter had been into Heritage Dental, and that
Mason was going to call the police if she ever came in again. (R. 782).
40.

Butler reported Myers' alleged complaint to Scheutzow.

Scheutzow testified that he called Myers and confirmed the complaint.
Myers confirms that she received a call from Scheutzow regarding Carter,
but denies making any complaint about Carter. (R. 783).
41.

Scheutzow reported the alleged Myers complaint to Engel, who

in turn reported it to Stahly. The decision was made to terminate Carter's
employment, due to her contact with Heritage Dental. (R. 782).

Myers denies that she ever made such a call, or that Mason even had the
authority to prevent Carter from servicing the individual dentists within
Heritage Dental. (R. 783).
-
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42.

Carter was not given any opportunity to respond to the

allegations regarding Heritage Dental prior to her termination. (R. 782)
43.

Sullivan Human Resources was not contacted in connection

with Carter's termination. (See Scheutzow Testimony, March 27,2003
Transcript, pp. 175-176; See Engel Testimony, March 28 Transcript, pp.
191-192,197).
44.

On March 25,1998, Scheutzow called Carter into a meeting in

Simmon's office and stated, "I need to terminate your employment effective
immediately." Carter asked why, and Scheutzow stated, "You did it again.
You went into an account that was not assigned to you." Carter asked which
account, and Scheutzow stated, "Heritage Dental." Carter lold Scheutzow
that Heritage Dental was her account, and offered to show it to him on her
run list. Scheutzow repeated, "I need to terminate your employment,
effective immediately." Carter then stated, "This isn't about crossing over in
a territory, this is about that letter I wrote, isn't it?" Scheutzow responded,
"I can't say." (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 133134; R. 782-783).
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45.

Scheutzow prepared an "exit interview form," that set form the

grounds of termination as "violation of Memo/Directive Dated
2/18/98.. ..Verified with Bev at Heritage...That Susan Carter called on
office." (R. 783 and Exh. P-25).
46.

On or about August 21,1998, Scheutzow added language to the

exit interview form, explaining his "I can't say" statement as follows: "Re
SC statement. J.S. said 'I can't say' should be—'I can't speak to that' (due
to not knowing what was in the letter.)" (See Exh. P-26).
47.

It is undisputed that Carter was never told she was not assigned

to the Heritage Dental account. (See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003
Transcript, pp. 133-134; R. 782-783). In short, Carter was terminated for
calling on her own account.
48. Carter contacted Anderson and complained about her
termination. Anderson subsequently contacted Carter and stated. "Yeah,
you don't work there any more and there's nothing I can do about it." (See
Carter Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 137-138; R. 782-783).
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49.

Carter contacted Stahly and complained about her termination.

Stahly stated that he had contacted Heritage Dental and confirmed the
complaint regarding Carter. {See Carter Testimony, March 26,2003
Transcript, p. 139).
50.

Carter filed a Charge of Discrimination with the UALD on

August 11,1998, alleging that she had been unlawfully terminated in
retaliation for making a complaint of gender discrimination. (R. I).
51.

After conducting an investigation, the UALD i ssued a

Determination finding reasonable cause to believe that Sullivan violated
Section 34A-5-106(l) in terminating Carter. (R. 16-19).
52.

Sullivan appealed said Determination, and the case was

assigned to the Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. After
the parties conducted substantial discovery, Sullivan filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment that was denied by the ALJ La Jeunesse, pursuant to an
Order dated November 27,2002. (R. 519=530).
53.

A four-day evidentiary hearing was held before ALJ La

Jeunesse, after which he issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
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Order, dated January 7,2004. (R. 769-793). In essence, ALJ La Jeunesse
found that Sullivan had Section 34A-5-106(l) in terminating Carter's
employment. ALJ La Jeunesse's decision included several determinations
regarding the credibility of various witnesses. The ALJ found, inter alia:
As with the Clegg account, the preponderance of the evidence in this
case demonstrated an animus against Ms. Carter on the part of
Sullivan-Schein independent of valid concerns over her dealings with
Heritage. Further, as with the Clegg account, Ms. Carter's superiors
at Sullivan-Schein appeared eager for an opportunity to discipline her
without any concern for the factual accuracy of the allegations of
wrongdoing leveled against her. Indeed, despite numerous apparently
valid crossover issues involving at one time or other all of the Utah
sales representatives, Sullivan-Schein only disciplined and terminated
Ms. Carter over factually specious allegations. (R 784).
54.

Sullivan filed a Motion for Review with the Appeals Board of

the Utah Labor Commission ("the Appeals Board") on March 8,2004. (R.
837-892). Carter submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to said Motion
for Review. (R. 897-925). No hearing was held in relation to said Motion for
Review, and no additional evidence or argument was requested from the
parties.
55.

On May 31,2005, the Appeals Board issued an Order Granting

Motion for Review. (R. 930-937). In essence, said Order reversed the
-24-

decision of ALJ La Jeunesse, and held mat Respondent had not violated
Section 34A-5-106(1) in terminating Carter. Said Order was based upon a
2-1 split decision of the Appeals Board, with two members voting in support
of the Order. A separate opinion written by the dissenting member of the
Appeals Board stated, in part: "The Majority's opinion is wrong on both the
facts and the law." (R. 936-937). In reversing the ALJ's decision, the
Majority of the Appeals Board did not address any of the credibility
determinations that he made.
56.

On June 20,2005, Carter filed a Motion to Reconsider Order on

Motion for Review. (R. 939-947). Said Motion was denied by the same 2-1
Majority of the Appeals Board, in an Order dated August 25,2005. (R. 970972).
57.

Carter timely filed and served her Petition for Review with the

Utah Court of Appeals on September 13,2005. (R. 974).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Majority of the Appeals Board exceeded its authority by

basing its decision upon arguments that were not previously raised in the
-25-

case. Utah Code Section 34A-1 -303(4)(c) sets forth the grounds upon
which the Appeals Board may base its decision, and does not permit the
Appeals Board to raise arguments that were not previously raised in the case.
In addition to exceeding its statutory authority, the action of the Appeals
Board was grossly unfair to Carter, who had no opportunity to respond to the
new arguments that were raised by the Appeals Board.
2.

The Majority of the Appeals Board failed to apply the

appropriate legal standards in determining Carter's retaliation claim. In
addition to the established elements of a prima facie case, the Majority
imposed requirements upon Carter that are not recognized under Utah or
Federal law. Specifically, the Majority found that an employer's "prompt
and appropriate action" in response to a complaint of discrimination negates
afindingof subsequent retaliation. Further, the Majority found that, when a
discrimination complaint involves events from several years before and at a
different employer, that fact negates afindingof retaliation. The Majority
cited no authority recognizing these requirements in a retaliation case.
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3.

The Majority of the Appeals Board committed legal error by

failing to address the credibility determinations that were made by the ALJ.
Under controlling Utah case law, where the decision of a hearing officer is
based to a large extent upon credibility determinations, a reviewing official
is required to adequately detail his or her reasons for reaching a different
result. In the present case, the Majority did not even acknowledge the
existence of credibility issues, much less state any reason for rejecting the
ALJ's credibility findings.
4.

The evidence cited by the Majority of the Appeals Board is

insufficient to support its decision in the case. The Majority relied upon
certain facts (i.e., Sullivan's prompt action in response to Carter's letter and
that fact that Carter's complaint involved events occurring several years
prior at a different employer), to negate an inference of retaliatory causation,
when, in actuality, such facts are completely immaterial to that issue. The
Majority also relied upon the alleged fact that the sales representatives who
complained about Carter did not know about Carter's complaint. However,
that fact is immaterial to the issue in the case, which is whether Sullivan
Management treated Carter adversely because of her complaint.
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The Majority also cited a complaint that was made against Carter by
Butler. However, the uncontested facts in the case show that such complaint
had no relation to Carter's termination.
The Majority substantially misconstrued the procedure that existed at
Sullivan in regard to assigning customer accounts during the time period in
which Carter was employed.
Finally, the Majority created excuses for Sullivan's failure to
communicate with Carter or follow its Discipline Policy. In summary, the
Majority's decision is based entirely upon facts that are immaterial,
erroneous, and/or unsupported by the record.

ARGUMENT
I.

MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE.

All of the evidence relied upon by the Appeals Board in support of its
decision is set forth within its Order Granting Motion for Review. (R. 930935). Such evidence includes the following:
(a).

The Majority found that Sullivan took "prompt and appropriate

action" in response to Carter's letter, thereby indicating that her letter was
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not a motivating factor for her termination. (R. 934). This argument had not
previously been raised in the case. The Majority cited no authority and
provided no reasoning in support of such conclusion.
(b).

The Majority found that Carter's letter complaining of gender

discrimination dealt with events several years past and at a different
employer, thereby indicating that her letter was not a motivating factor for
her termination. (R. 934). The Majority cited no authority and provided no
reasoning in support of such conclusion.
(c).

The Majority found that the sales representatives who

complained about Carter did not know about Carter's letter. (R. 934). In
fact, there was evidence that Bingham did know about the letter. (See Carter
Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 129-131). More importantly,
this finding is immaterial to the relevant issue in the case, which is whether
Sullivan Management treated Carter adversely because of her complaint.
(d).

The Majority found that Butler made a complaint about Carter

regarding the account of Dr. Brooks. (R. 932,934). However, Carter never
received any discipline for calling on his account, and Sullivan has never
asserted that Carter's calling on Dr. Brooks was a reason for her termination.
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{See Butler Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 241-245; See
Scheutzow Testimony, June 10,2003 Transcript, pp. 67-68).
(e).

With respect to Sullivan's failure to discuss the crossover

complaints with Carter, or to involve Human Resources in her disciplinary
action and termination, the Majority found:
Sullivan-Schein's failure to investigate the details of the
complaints against Ms. Carter is most reasonably attributable
to 1) wide-ranging responsibilities of Sullivan-Schein
managers; 2) disorganization and confusion engendered by the
merger, 3) the company's paramount concern for the continuity
of its newly combined sales force; and 4) the repetitive nature
of the complaints about Ms. Carter's conduct." (R. 935).
(emphasis added).
None of these arguments had previously been raised in the case, and
there is no evidence in the record to support them.
(f).

The Majority made the following finding with respect to the

procedure that Sullivan used in assigning accounts to sales representatives:
To minimize the crossover problem, Sullivan-Schein began a
process of identifying each sales representative's accounts. In
cases where only one representative had been servicing an
account, that representative retained the account. If more than
one representative had been servicing an account, the account
was assigned to the representative with the highest sales to the
account. But if a customer expressed a preference for a
particular sales representative, the account was assigned to that
sales representative. In conjunction with this process of
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identifying accounts, two rules were emphasized by SullivanSchein management and by the sales representatives
themselves. First, no sales representative should have dealings
with customers assigned to another sales representative.
Second, no sales representative should solicit a customer to
express a preference for that representative. This last rule was
referred to as "soliciting loyalty." (R. 931-932).
The Majority cited no evidentiary basis for this description of
Sullivan's procedure, and this description is substantially inaccurate. For
example, there is no evidentiary basis for the Majority's statement that, "no
sales representatives should have dealings with customers assigned to
another sales representative." The Majority also overlooks undisputed
evidence regarding ambiguities and "grey areas" within Sullivan's procedure
that were noted by the ALJ. (R. 777).
Most importantly, the Majority disregarded undisputed evidence that
Sullivan's initial procedure in relation to account assignments was to
have the sales representatives continue calling on the same accounts that
they had called upon prior to the merger. (See preceding Paras. 1517). It was this procedure that led to the crossover problems, and this
procedure remained substantially in effect up until the time of Carter's
termination
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The following Sections of this Argument expound upon the abovestated defects within the findings and conclusions of the Appeals Board.
II.

THE APPEALS BOARD EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN
CONSIDERING ARGUMENTS THAT WERE NOT
PREVIOUSLY RAISED IN THE CASE.

In reaching its decision, the Majority of the Appeals Board
substantially relied upon two arguments that had not previously been raised
in the case:
(1) that Sullivan's "prompt and appropriate action" in response to
Carter's letter negated a finding of subsequent retaliation, and
(2) that Sullivan's failure to investigate the details of the complaints
against Carter was "most reasonably attributable to:" (1) wide-ranging
responsibilities of Sullivan-Schein managers; 2) disorganization and
confusion engendered by the merger; 3) the company's paramount concern
for the continuity of its newly combined sales force; and 4) the repetitive
nature of the complaints about Ms. Carter's conduct." (R. 935).
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Utah Code Section 34A-l-303(4)(c) states:
The commissioner or the Appeals Board may base its
decision on:
(i) the evidence previously submitted in the case; or
(ii) on written argument or written supplemental
evidence requested by the commissioner or Appeals
Board.
By its express terms, Section 34A-l-303(4)(c) limits the factors upon
which the Appeals Board may base its decision. These factors do not
include new arguments that are raised for thefirsttime by the Appeals Board
upon review. To the contrary, Section 34A-l-303(4Xc) limits the Appeals
Board decision to "written argument...requested by the Appeals Board."
Although the distinction between "evidence" and "argument" is not
always clear, such a distinction exists within the express terms of Section
34A-l-303(4)(c). The assertion of the Appeals Board that Sullivan's alleged
prompt and appropriate response to Carter's letter negates an inference of
retaliation constitutes an argument, i.e., it is not simply a finding of fact, but
an argument that a legal conclusion is warranted by certain facts.
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The Appeals Board's finding that Sullivan's failure to investigate the
details of the complaints against Ms. Carter is "most reasonably attributable
to" certain factors also constitutes an argument, i.e., a legal conclusion
derived from certain alleged facts.
The Appeals Board's use of arguments that were not previously raised
in the case exceeds its authority, and substantially undermines the validity
of its decision. Further, the Appeals Board's use of such arguments is
grossly unfair to Carter, who had no opportunity to respond to such
arguments prior to the Appeals Board's decision.
Since the Appeals Board exceeded its authority in making a decision
based upon arguments that had not previously been raised in the case, the
decision of the Appeals Board should be reversed and the decision of the
ALJ should be adopted. Giles v. Industrial Com'n. 692 P.2d 743 (Utah
1984). In the alternative, the case should be remanded to the Appeals Board
for an amended decision that does not rely upon arguments that were not
previously raised in the case. Vali Convalescent and Care Inst v. Div. Of
Health Care Financing. 797 P.2d 438 (Utah 1990).
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III.

THE APPEALS BOARD FAILED TO APPLY THE PROPER
LEGAL STANDARD IN DETERMINING CARTER'S
RETALIATION CLAIM.

The Majority of the Appeals Board failed to apply the proper legal
standard in determining Carter's retaliation claim. Specifically, the Majority
imposed additional requirements upon Carter that are not recognized under
Utah or Federal law.
The Majority correctly set forth the elements of a prima facie case of
retaliation under Utah Code Section 34A-5-106 as follows: 1) protected
opposition to discrimination; 2) adverse action by the employer subsequent
to the protected activity; and 3) a causal connection between the employee's
activity and the adverse action. (R. 933-934) (quoting Viktron/Lika v. Labor
Commission. 38 P.3d 993,995 (Utah App. 2001). Notably absent from these
elements is any requirement that the employer fail to take prompt or
appropriate action in response to the underlying complaint of discrimination.
The Appeals Board held that Carter met the first two elements of a
prima facie case of retaliation. (R. 933-934). The Appeals Board then
turned to the third element, i.e., causation. In deciding that issue the
Appeals Board imposed two requirements upon Carter that have not been
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recognized under controlling case law. First, The Appeals Board effectively
required Carter to prove Sullivan failed to take prompt and appropriate
action in response to the underlying discrimination complaint. Although this
element is required in discriminatory harassment cases (see, e.g., Hirase-Doi
v. U.S. West Communications. 61 F.3d 777 (10th Cir. 1995), it has never
been applied in retaliation claims. Neither the Appeals Board nor Sullivan
has cited any authority or provided any analysis as to why this factor should
be relevant to a retaliation claim. In fact, Sullivan never even raised this
argument prior to the Appeals Board's decision.
Employers are required by Federal and State law to take prompt and
effective action in response to discrimination complaints. An employer's
taking such action does not create any inference as to whether it
subsequently retaliates against an employee for making the complaint.
By construing Respondent's alleged prompt and appropriate response as
evidence of non-retaliation, the Majority has conflated the elements of a
retaliation claim and the elements of a discriminatory harassment claim. This
approach is erroneous as a matter of law.
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The Majority also effectively imposed a requirement that the
underlying discrimination complaint involve contemporaneous events at the
current employer. As stated above, the first element of a retaliation claim is
engagement in protected opposition to discrimination. There is no dispute in
this case that Carter's December 14,1997 constituted protected opposition to
discrimination. In fact, the Appeals Board found that Carter satisfied this
element. However, the Appeals Board proceeded to find that, because
Carter's complaint involved events from several years before and at a
different employer, that fact weighed against a finding of retaliation. In
making this conclusion, the Majority either modified the first element of the
retaliation claim, or created a new requirement—that the underlying
opposition to discrimination involve contemporaneous events at the current
employer. In either case, this additional requirement has not been
recognized under Utah or Federal law.
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IV.

THE APPEALS BOARD FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
FINDINGS OF THE ALJ AS TO CREDIBILITY.

The ALJ's decision in this case was substantially based upon findings
regarding the credibility of the witnesses. The following credibility
determinations, at least, were crucial to his decision:
1.

The ALJ did not believe Scheutzow's testimony, given both at

Trial and during his Deposition, that he was unaware of Carter's December
14,1997 letter at any time prior to Carter's termination. In fact,
Scheutzow's knowledge of Carter's letter was established by Simmons, a
witness who was certainly not favorable to Carter, who testified that
Scheutzow not only knew about Carter's letter, but that he also stated,
"everybody better be careful." (R. 774-775).
Scheutzow is a critical witness in this case. He at least initiated
Carter's termination. Further, he knew that the stated grounds for Carter's
termination—calling on the account of another sales representative—was
false. The fact that the ALJ found Scheutzow was not a credible witness
was crucial to his decision.
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Second, the ALJ found that the testimony of Sullivan's witnesses
regarding Engel's February 18,1998 letter to Carter was "almost surreal."
(R. 781). In essence, Bingham testified that she complained about Carter's
contacts with Dr. Clegg's office to Brown, who suggested that she contact
Scheutzow. Bingham then contacted Scheutzow, who suggested she write a
letter to Engel. Engel testified that Scheutzow requested he write the letter
to Carter, and that he did not see any letter from Bingham. Scheutzow
testified that he had no knowledge of Engel's letter to Carter until after it
was sent.
Sullivan has never attempted to explain the extensive conflicts in this
testimony. Although the inconsistencies in themselves do not prove
retaliation, they are probative when considered with other evidence, such as
the admittedly harsh tone of Engel's letter, Engel's failure to discuss the
issue with Carter or Human Resources prior to sending the letter, and the
fact that no other sales representative received discipline for crossovers
despite die numerous crossovers that occurred. Based upon these facts, the
ALJ concluded, not just that Carter's termination was unwarranted, but that
Sullivan Management "employed fallacious assertions against Ms. Carter...
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as grounds for the termination of her employment" (R.785). TheALJ
further found: "Sullivan-Schein had the ability to easily ascertain the truth
concerning either the Clegg or Heritage accounts. Yet, Sullivan-Schein
conspicuously avoided any opportunity for Ms. Carter to explain her
conduct. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence in this case
demonstrated that the Clegg and Heritage episodes amounted to gossamer
pretexts for the termination of Ms. Carter." (R.786).
The ALJ's decision in this case was clearly based upon his assessment
of the credibility of the witnesses. However, the Majority of the Appeals
Board did not mention any of these findings. In fact, the Majority's decision
does not even contain the word "credibility."
In Vali Convalescent and Care Inst. V. Div. Of Health Care
Financing. 797 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1990), a DOH hearing officer
determined that Vali had not intended to settle its claim for interest allegedly
owed to it by DOH. Such determination was substantially based upon the
hearing officer's assessment of the witnesses' credibility. However, the
hearing officer's decision was reversed upon review by the Division's
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Executive Director, who determined that Vali had settled its claim for
interest. The decision of the Director was subsequently affirmed upon
review by the District Court.
Upon appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals first noted that the degree of
deference accorded to the decision of an administrative agency varies based,
in part, upon the expertise of the agency on the particular issue. The Court
of Appeals found that the agency had comparatively little expertise
regarding the key issues in the case. 797 P.2d at 442. The Court of Appeals
then held that: "where, as here, the hearing officer's findings were
apparently based to a large extent upon his credibility determinations, and
the executive director took no live testimony, it is even more important for
the executive director to adequately detail her reasons for reaching a
different result." 797 P.2d at 447. The Court of Appeals remanded the case
to the executive director for the purpose of making adequate findings. Id.
The credibility determinations made by the ALT in the present case
were at least as crucial to his decision as they were in Vali Convalescent.
The failure of the Appeals Board to even consider the credibility issues in
this case constitute reversible error.
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V.

THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE DOES NOT SUPPORT
THE DECISION OF THE APPEALS BOARD.

In determining whether the decision of the Appeals Board is
supported by substantial evidence, the Court should first consider the degree
of expertise that the agency possesses with respect to cases such as the
present case. Vali Convalescent 797 P.2d at 442. The agency certainly has
no greater expertise than the Court of Appeals in deciding discrimination
cases. See, e.g., Viktron/Lika v. Labor Commission. 38 P.3d 993,995 (Utah
App. 2001). Nor does the agency have any particular expertise in resolving
conflicting evidence or discerning intent from circumstantial evidence.
Therefore, this Court's deference to the decision of the Appeals Board
should be limited.
Further, as stated in Vali Convalescent 797 P.2d at 447, where a
hearing officer's findings are based upon personal observation of the
witnesses, they tend to negate the reasonableness of contrary findings and
conclusions of the reviewing agency board. Moreover, the decision of the
Appeals Board was split 2-1 in this case.
The reliability of the Appeals Board's decision in this case is further
undermined by the Majority's failure to consider or address the numerous
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facts and circumstances that were set forth by the ALJ in support of his
decision. The Majority simply rejected the extensivefindingsmade by the
ALJ without giving any reason. The Majority completely overlooked
numerous facts (including credibility determinations) that tend to support the
ALJ's conclusions, in favor of a few arguments or inferences that the
Majority chose to make in favor of Sullivan. Moreover, the Majority never
weighed or considered its arguments or inferences in light of the entire
circumstances of the case.
However, even affording full deference to the Appeals Board in this
case, the arguments or inferences mat were cited by the Majority simply do
not support its decision. The Majority cited the following reasons in support
of its decision:
(a).

The Majority found that Sullivan took "prompt and appropriate

action" in response to Carter's letter, thereby indicating that her letter was
not a motivating factor for her termination. (R. 934). The Majority cited no
authority and provided no rationale in support of this conclusion. In fact,
there is no reasonable basis for an assumption that, just because Sullivan
took prompt action in response to Carter's complaint, it did not subsequently
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commit retaliation against Carter. Even if such a conclusion might be
warranted in some cases, it should not apply where, as in the present case,
the persons who took the "prompt action" were different than the persons
who committed the retaliation (and notably failed to contact Human
Resources in regard to their actions).
(b).

The Majority found that Carter's letter complaining of gender

discrimination dealt with events several years past and at a different
employer, thereby indicating that her letter was not a motivating factor for
her termination. (R. 934). The Majority cited no authority and provided no
reasoning in support of such conclusion. Again, there is no reasonable basis
for an assumption that, just because Carter's letter dealt with past events,
Sullivan did not engage in retaliation against Carter. Carter was a current
Sullivan employee. The persons she complained about (Simmons and
Brown) were current Sullivan employees, working in the same office as
Carter. The complaint was made to Sullivan Management, and was
disclosed to at least eight Sullivan Managers, in addition to Simmons and
Brown. It was never disputed that the complaint constituted protected
activity. The fact that Carter's complaint involved events from years past
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is simply irrelevant to the issue of causation.
(c).

The Majority found that the sales representatives who

complained about Carter did not know about Carter's letter. (R. 934). In
fact, there was evidence that Bingham did know about the letter. (See Carter
Testimony, March 26,2003 Transcript, pp. 129-131). More importantly,
this finding simply misses the relevant point, which is whether Sullivan
Management treated Carter adversely due to animosity arising from her
letter.
The ALJ found that the crossover complaints against Carter were
factually without merit. (R. 785). However, that was not the basis for his
decision. More importantly, the ALJ found that Carter's Managers avoided
or disregarded any information that explained the crossover issues, in order
to create a pretextual basis for Carter's termination. (R. 786). The ALJ
further found that, in this respect, Carter's Managers treated her differently
than the other sales representatives, all of whom had crossover issues, but
did not receive discipline.
The ALJ's determination mat the crossover complaints against Carter
were unfounded was essential to his decision, but he did not confuse that
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issue with the ultimate issue in the case, which is whether Carter's
Manager's discriminated against Carter because of her complaint. The
Appeals Board, on the other hand, completely failed to consider whether
Carter's Manager's treated Carter adversely in relation to the crossovers
because of her complaint. The Appeals Board simply states that Carter's
coworkers did not know about her complaint, and leaves its analysis at that
point. The Appeals Board fails to mention that Carter's Managers did know
about Carter's complaint, and also knew that the crossover complaints
against Carter were false (or deliberately avoided such knowledge). The
Majority's decision does not consider this crucial point.
(d).

The Majority found that there was a complaint against Carter

made by Butler regarding the account of Dr. Brooks. (R. 932,934). The
Majority disregards the fact that Dr. Brooks' account was assigned to Carter,
and that she never received any discipline for calling on his account.
Sullivan has never asserted that Carter's calling on Dr. Brooks was a reason
for her discipline or termination.
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(e).

With respect to Sullivan's failure to discuss the crossover

complaints with Carter, or to involve Human Resources in her disciplinary
action and termination, the Majority found:
Sullivan-Schein's failure to investigate the details of the
complaints against Ms. Carter is most reasonably attributable
to 1) wide-ranging responsibilities of Sullivan-Schein
managers; 2) disorganization and confusion engendered by the
merger; 3) the company's paramount concern for the continuity
of its newly combined sales force; and 4) the repetitive nature
of the complaints about Ms. Carter's conduct." (R. 935).
(emphasis added).
The Appeals Board cited no evidence in support of these assertions,
and there is no such evidence in the record. Further, it is inconsistent for the
Appeals Board to assert that Sullivan took prompt and appropriate action in
response to Carter's complaint, but was unable to even ask Carter about the
validity of the complaints that were made against her. Indeed, when Carter
tried to explain to Scheutzow that Heritage Dental was her account,
Scheutzow refused to listen. The Majority disregarded the facts of the case
and made excuses for Sullivan's conduct that are not supported by the
record.
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(f).

The Majority made the following findings with respect to the

procedure that Sullivan used in assigning accounts to sales representatives:
To minimize the crossover problem, Sullivan-Schein began a
process of identifying each sales representative's accounts. In
cases where only one representative had been servicing an
account, that representative retained the account. If more than
one representative had been servicing an account, the account
was assigned to the representative with the highest sales to the
account. But if a customer expressed a preference for a
particular sales representative, the account was assigned to that
sales representative. In conjunction with this process of
identifying accounts, two rules were emphasized by SullivanSchein management and by the sales representatives
themselves. First, no sales representative should have dealings
with customers assigned to another sales representative.
Second, no sales representative should solicit a customer to
express a preference for that representative. This last rule was
referred to as "soliciting loyalty." (R. 931-932).
The Majority cited no evidentiary basis for this description of
Sullivan's procedure, which is substantially inaccurate. For example, there
is no evidentiary basis for the Majority's statement that, "no sales
representatives should have dealings with customers assigned to
another sales representative." The Majority also overlooks undisputed
evidence regarding ambiguities and "grey areas" within Sullivan's procedure
that were noted by the ALJ. (R. 777).
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Most importantly, the Majority disregarded undisputed evidence that
Sullivan's initial procedure in relation to account assignments was to
have the sales representatives continue calling on the same accounts that
they were calling on prior to the merger. (See preceding Paras, 1517). It was this procedure that led to the crossover problems, and this
procedure remained substantially in effect up until the time of Carter's
termination, as indicated by Butler's testimony that Sullivan held a meeting
with the Salt Lake City sales representatives to address the crossover issues
shortly after Carter was terminated. (See Statement of Facts, Para. 9).
Asidefromthe legal errors in the Appeal Board's decision in this
case, the evidence cited by the Appeals Board does not reasonably support
its decision. Further, the Appeals Board did not address the extensive
findings mat were made by the ALJ. Therefore, this Court should vacate the
decision of the Appeals Board and adopt the decision of the ALJ.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing authorities, facts and arguments, Carter requests
that the decision of the Appeals Board in this case be vacated, and that the
decision of the ALJ be adopted. In the alternative, Carter requests that this
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case be remanded to the Appeals Board for an amended decision based upon
the applicable law and the evidence in the case.
Respectfully submitted this

day of January, 2006.

Kenneth B. Grimes
Attorney for Petitioner
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